The Cognitive and Social Psychology of the Contagious Organizational Corruption by Darley, John M.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4
SYMPOSIUM:
Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers:
Perspectives from Law and Society Psychology
Article 2
2005
The Cognitive and Social Psychology of the
Contagious Organizational Corruption
John M. Darley
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of the Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss4/2
 4/19/2005 4:11:17 PM 
The Cognitive and Social Psychology 
of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption* 
John M. Darley† 
I. CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE 
OF THE PROBLEM  
Seen in the clear light cast by hindsight, several related 
puzzlements emerge about the recent cases of corporate 
corruption. First, although such scandals may begin small, 
they often grow to huge and blatant proportions. Second, 
because of their blatant character, they seem suicidally stupid. 
They will eventually be detected, with the inevitable disgrace 
that this will bring about for participants. Third, in their later 
stages, they come to involve a number of people in the 
organization who are busily involved in committing complicit 
actions that forward the corruption. How all of this certainly 
unethical and generally stupid thought and behavior comes 
about is the problem that I will examine in this article. In sum, 
people seem more recruitable into corrupt practices than we 
would think.  
Another puzzlement that has come to our attention is 
what seems to be the high frequency with which these 
problems occur. One social scientist, looking back over the past 
few decades, has produced a chapter on thirty-six different and 
major cases of what he calls corporate “crime and violence.”1 
Over the past few years, many major U.S. corporations have 
been caught in acts of corruption of quite startling magnitude. 
  
 * © 2005 John M. Darley. All Rights Reserved. 
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 1 RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BUSINESS 
POWER AND THE ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST (1988). 
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To emphasize the question that this raises, why are so many of 
these incidents taking place in organizations that we would 
have thought were staffed by morally good people who were 
also prudent enough to realize that corrupt practices are 
frequently detected? That is, these corrupt incidents so often 
seem to involve corrupt, rule breaking actions by people who 
we would have assumed were moral, prudential actors.  
One conventional answer that resolves the puzzlement 
is to retrospectively decide that the assumption that we made 
about the people in question, that they were moral and 
prudential actors, was wrong; more specifically, that they were 
persons searching for corrupt opportunities, and were blinded 
to the probabilities of detection by their greed. The reader will 
recognize this stance as a variant of the “few bad apples” 
theory that has been cited to explain recent acts of corporate 
corruption such as the mutual fund scandals or the 
organizational corruption that led to the torture of Iraqi 
prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib.  
I want to suggest that the bad apple theory is at best a 
factually incorrect reading of what has happened. In fact it is 
simply a useful fiction that enables those who hide behind it to 
avoid the more thoroughgoing implications of recent 
transgressions. Specifically, clinging to the myth enables us to 
avoid the realization that the world of corporate or 
governmental ethics requires more attention and more painful 
redesign than the minor housekeeping implied by the course of 
action involving the elimination of already discovered 
malefactors from a system that we assume is otherwise 
working perfectly. For those that hide behind the bad apple 
myth, the sole remedy is to be more careful at the recruiting 
and training end of the organizational world; perhaps checking 
the credentials of job candidates better, perhaps by the 
technological fix promised by the quest for the modern “lie 
detector” that will ensnare the wrongdoer on the way to his 
wrongdoing.  
In this article, I will attempt to answer two questions 
that come to the mind of a psychologist who thinks about 
organizational corruption. First, why are so many “initial 
corrupt acts” taken in organizations? The answer cannot be 
that it is simply already-corrupt people who take these actions. 
Part of the answer is that some of the people who launch these 
corruption-initiating acts do not scrutinize these contemplated 
acts from an ethical perspective. Strange as it may seem, they 
do not see them as unethical.  
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The second question then becomes “why is it so easy to 
recruit other members of the organization to take the actions 
that amplify, extend, and continue these initiating actions to 
produce more and more corrupt outcomes?” What causes the 
organization to turn itself into one that works together to 
produce full-blown ethical transgressions? To foreshadow what 
I will suggest, the answer to this second question is threefold. 
First, because these others often accept the implied definition 
that the first actions were ethical in nature, the distance 
between that first act and the next one that amplifies it are not 
easily recognizable. Second, these follow on acts are perhaps 
seen as ethically grey and further are produced out of 
considerations of group loyalty and commitment. Third, when 
one is a committed member of an organization, social identity 
theory2 points out that we experience an alteration in 
personality. We “become” the prototypic member of the group, 
and the cues around us are that the prototypic group members 
are engaging in the corrupt actions. Thus we do so also. 
Finally, it is a little noticed truth that our society offers 
alternate identities to citizens, and some of them allow for 
acting in ways that, from the perspective of another identity 
the person could assume, are unethical.  
To arrive at a better explanation of the apparently 
“infectious explosion” of these acts of corporate and 
organizational corruption, we need to consider several sources 
of information. First, the narratives that have emerged from 
first party participants in episodes of corruption, second, a new 
perspective that is emerging from judgment and decision 
making research about how it is that human decisions are 
made, and third we must take a closer look at the choices faced 
by individuals in an organization as the corruption begins to 
impinge on them.  
II. THE INITIATION OF CORRUPT SEQUENCES 
How does the first corrupt act, the one that starts the 
process in the wrong direction, come about? Let’s look at the 
narratives first. Sometimes the stories of corruption are simple. 
The organizational leaders deliberately act to bring about 
corrupt or otherwise immoral actions by the organizations they 
  
 2 Michael A. Hogg & Elizabeth A. Hardie, Prototypicality, Conformity and 
Depersonalized Attraction: A Self-Categorization Analysis of Group Cohesiveness, 3 
BRIT. J. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 41-56 (1992). 
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lead. Thus, Film Recovery Systems, Inc. hired workers who 
could not read English so that they would not be able to read 
warnings on the containers of dangerous chemicals they were 
using in the deliberately dangerous processes of recovering 
silver from used photographic plates.3 Perhaps the easiest 
explanation for how the company is able to enlist the 
organizational members, in this case the foremen who gave the 
workers their orders, in carrying out the actual immoral 
actions is that the superiors who are determined to carry out 
corrupt practices simply recruit subordinates who will be 
willing to engage in corrupt practices.  
But we should also consider some more disquieting 
narratives, which seem to suggest that the corrupt practices 
are somehow stumbled into, without exactly being intentional. 
This is a disturbing perspective, one that challenges the notion 
that corruption begins in corruption, that the source of corrupt 
acts is those individuals who are corrupt and extract corruption 
from their followers.  
From this perspective, acts that start a chain of other 
actions that ultimately result in full blown corrupt actions 
often have their origins in actions that are not themselves 
corrupt, or at least not perceived as so by the original actors.  
If this is so, then we lose the comfort of being able to 
deny that we ourselves would ever be enmeshed in corrupt 
acts. We deny the message given by the frequency with which 
we discover that the actors enmeshed in corrupt activities are 
anguished individuals, frequently individuals who saw very 
clearly that detection was, if not inevitable, at least highly 
likely. They simply could not see a way to escape from the 
meshes of the collective processes that were ongoing.  
In our conventional way of thinking about ourselves, we 
are confident that we would know in advance that to do some 
set of actions would be morally wrong, and that this 
realization, occurring prior to the actions, would prevent us 
from taking them.  
These comforting thoughts turn out to be not true. 
Instead, people habitually commit actions that are self-serving, 
or unduly favorable to the organizations in which they are 
situated. On careful examination by a non-biased individual, 
these actions would be judged to be morally dubious or morally 
  
 3 A succinct account of this corporation and its misdeeds is given in Nancy 
Frank, Murder in the Workplace, in CORPORATE VIOLENCE (Stuart L. Hills ed., 1987). 
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just wrong. But they don’t receive that scrutiny. These actions 
are often the ones that set in motion a cascade of further 
corrupt actions; that set up what we might think of as the 
tornado of corruption that gathers force and pulls in more of 
the organization’s members. So let us call these initiating 
actions the generative actions of corruption. 
An example of this is useful, and there is one that is 
often cited in the literature. The circumstances that bring it 
about are the constant and high pressures for a for-profit 
organization to show a steady rise in earnings in each 
successive reporting quarter. But what counts as “a sale” that 
can be counted as earnings in a particular quarter? There is 
often judgment required in answering this question. But if the 
sale can be counted in the present quarter, and it will move 
earnings to a higher level, then the temptation is to “recognize 
the revenue” in the present quarter.  
The example involves the practice of tobacco companies 
at the end of the business quarter. 
Loading wasn’t unique to Reynolds, every tobacco company did it to 
some extent. Just prior to its regular semiannual price hikes, 
Reynolds regularly offered huge volumes of cigarettes to its 
customers—customers and supermarket chains—at the old prices. 
Customers loved it because they could sell low-cost cigarettes at the 
new, higher prices. Reynolds loved it because it cleared away 
unwanted inventory, kept the factories humming, and, most 
important, produced large, artificial, end of the quarter profits.4  
The problem with this was that the distributors were free to 
return the cigarettes to Reynolds a month or two into the new 
quarter, after they had served to create the fictitious “profits” 
at the end of the last quarter 
III. THE UNFORTUNATE CASE OF AUTOMATIC INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENTS 
Earlier I said that some of these acts that initiated 
further corrupt practices were not decided upon in any very 
thoughtful way. This needs explication. Recently, psychologists 
have summarized5 a good deal of research and thinking about 
decision processes as requiring us to make a distinction 
  
 4 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL 
OF RJR NABISCO 58 (Harper Perennial ed., HarperCollins 1991) (1990).  
 5 Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective of Judgment and Choice: Mapping 
Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 697-720 (2003). 
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between several rather independent systems that inform us 
about the world. For some time, we have known that we need 
to distinguish the human perceptual system from the human 
reasoning system. The perceptual system presents us with 
what we “see.” We know in fact from countless demonstrations 
that perception is in fact a decision process, in the sense that it 
involves a good deal of past learning, often confirms 
stereotypes and generally sees what we expect to be there. 
However, partially because perceptual processes are 
overlearned, partially because they are what we now call 
automatic, we are misled about the truth of our perceptions. 
What we “see” must be what is true, a stance that is generally 
called naïve realism. What we see is unproblematically true.  
On the other hand, when we engage the reasoning 
system, which we sometimes use to make decisions, we are 
aware that reasoning is in progress because that reasoning in 
controlled and effortful. It often involves deliberately engaging 
problem solving rules that we have learned before. Therefore it 
is often cued into action by the conscious recognition of “what 
kind of problem that it is.”  
It is Kahneman’s recommendation6 that it is worth 
distinguishing a third cognitive system that shares components 
of both of these other systems, and exists intermediate between 
them. This we will call the intuitive system. More will be said 
about it in a minute, but let me tell you the use I will make of it 
this discussion of corporate corruption. Recent research 
demonstrates that it often the case that the acts that can 
originate unethical chains of occurrences arise from the quick 
decisions that are products of the intuitive judgment system. 
As one consequence, these acts often are not subject to the 
scrutiny by the actor that we apply to action decisions that we 
know are the product of the more deliberative reasoning 
system.  
Here is the cash value of this realization. It pinpoints 
the attributional mistake we make when we think people who 
commit unethical actions are characterologically unethical. We 
expect that all good people, and we ourselves, scrutinize acts 
that we are contemplating taking from an ethical perspective. 
Therefore we do not take unethical courses of action. We then 
reason that if an ethically wrong act is committed, a person 
who is morally corrupt has committed it—we have returned to 
  
 6 Id. at 697-99. 
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the “bad apple” theory. The way to deal with corruption is to 
screen out individuals who are corrupt.  
The disturbing message from those that study decision-
making is that these reassuring thoughts are untrue. Many of 
the actions that begin cycles of corruption are the products of 
the intuitive judgment system, which means that they are 
rapidly arrived at, less than consciously considered, and 
unintentional in their ethical dubiousness. Further, they are 
often the product of pressure to make fast decisions. And under 
this condition, they are not subject to the monitoring of the 
decision, which is done by the reasoning system. As Kahneman7 
comments, “the monitoring is normally quite lax and allows 
many intuitive judgments to be expressed, including some that 
are erroneous.” The suggestion that emerges is that the 
“natural” intuitive decision is likely to be a self interested one. 
To quote researchers on this topic: 
[S]elf-interest is automatic, viscerally compelling, and often 
unconscious. Understanding one’s ethical and professional 
obligations to others, in contrast, often involves a more thoughtful 
process. The automatic nature of self-interest gives it a primal power 
to influence judgment and makes it difficult for people to understand 
its influence on their judgment, let alone eradicate its influence.8 
This decision may be overridden by the more deliberate 
thinking of the reasoning system, but only if something 
triggers that system into action. Thus, in sum, corrupt actions 
are often committed by people who are not themselves corrupt. 
A. Self-Interested Intuitive Judgments 
Let us trace this out at the level of personal decision-
making. A doctor orders perhaps unnecessary tests for a 
patient from a testing laboratory in which he has a financial 
stake. He knows he did not make a self-interested decision 
because he knows that “he didn’t even think” of his stake in the 
laboratory while he was making the decision. A human 
relations person hires a member of her ethnic group for a job 
for which there were many candidates, and is sure that the 
decision is a fair one because she “examined the credentials of 
all of the candidates with an open mind.” An auditor examines 
  
 7 Id. at 699. 
 8 Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity and the 
Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOCIAL JUST. RES. 189, 189-202 (2004). 
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the accounts of a corporation his firm is engaged to audit and is 
sure his judgments of the acceptability of various decisions that 
the corporation has taken are appropriate according to a fair 
reading of the auditing standards. But in all of these cases, it is 
possible that in fact these sorts of decisions are frequently 
biased by self-interest,9 in-group favoritism,10 egocentricism,11or 
conflicts of interest.  
B.  A Biased Intuition and its Entrapping Consequences 
A well-known example from corporate life is useful here. 
It is driven by the previously mentioned desire of the 
organization to produce smooth patterns of earnings across the 
quarterly reporting periods. It involves what becomes 
“improper revenue recognition.” The problem it solves is 
enabling sales of product to be sufficiently concrete to be 
bookkeeped in the present quarter rather than the next one.  
The famous organizational example involves the 
Kurzweil Applied Intelligence Company.12 First, the CEO 
allowed sales persons to post sales that in fact came in a few 
days after the quarter closed. This seems a rather harmless 
practice, but it creates a slippery slope problem that is well-
described by Tenbrunsel and Messick.13 By allowing the act, the 
CEO authoritatively stamped that act as ethically allowable. 
But if it is acceptable to “count” orders a little after the quarter 
closed, then why is it not ethical to count orders that came in a 
day or so after the late orders that were allowable?  
Eventually, the company went so far down this path 
that they counted orders far into the next quarter as revenue, 
and then salespersons began forging customer signatures on 
orders that they thought would be forthcoming and counted 
those. And so on. 
Notice two things that were happening. First, 
eventually a line was crossed from ethically grey actions to 
blatantly illegal ones; eventually when the auditors wrote to 
  
 9 Id.  
 10 Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, 
and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOCIAL JUST. RES. 143, 143-69 (2004). For a 
review of implict ingroup favoritism research, see id. at 146-48. 
 11 For a review of the work on egocentric ethics, see Nicholas Epley & Eugene 
Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOCIAL JUST. RES. 171, 171-87 (2004). 
 12 Mark Maremont, Anatomy of a Fraud, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 16, 1996 at 90-94. 
 13 Ann Tenbrunsel & David Messick, Ethical Fading, the Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOCIAL JUST. RES. 223, 228-29 (2004). 
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customers to verify sales contracts, bogus responses from “the 
customers” were also forged. And second, notice that the 
eventual fraudulent endpoint was a consequence of the first 
grey actions. Robbing sales from the next quarter to pad results 
for this quarter made it more likely that the next quarter 
would be short even more sales. Thus the company was in some 
very real sense committing itself to an increasingly morally 
wrong and desperate set of escalating acts. But that 
commitment was unlikely to be apparent to the actors who 
initially claimed a few sales from the beginning of the next 
quarter. The slippery slope was inevitable but unforeseen. 
The moral is that an initial ethically grey act can later 
been seen as committing the corporation to further and further 
actions, and these later actions were more and more clearly 
across any ethically boundaries that could be imagined when 
the first steps were taken.  
IV.  ENTRAINMENT 
I have given a brief sketch of psychologists’ current 
thinking of the two rather different stances in which decisions 
get made. One way of drawing the implications of this for the 
present problem is to say that people are ethical, but only 
intermittently so. Whether we will be ethical depends on 
whether events in the past or the present trigger the reasoning 
system to generate a checking ethical perspective on courses of 
action that are generated from other more intuitive 
perspectives. This solves the problem of why it is that so many 
ethically bad actions are authored by individuals who are not 
themselves chronically unethical.  
The next problem to solve is why these initial unethical 
actions so often seem to capture others in the organization, who 
build on, add to, and amplify the continuing chain of unethical 
actions. This past example of counting non-existent orders as 
revenue is one such example.  
Let me give you a metaphor for what I want to suggest. 
Entrainment is a concept that comes from early twentieth 
century that I want to borrow for an organizational process. 
Originally it referred to a perceptual phenomenon: an object is 
moving in one direction. As it passes other stationary objects, 
those objects themselves begin to move, and they move in the 
same direction as the original object. This seems to be to be a 
useful visual metaphor for the way that a corrupt act seems to 
affect an organization. Often it spreads in the following senses. 
 4/19/2005 4:11:17 PM 
1186 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
More and more people commit similar acts, often ones 
“triggered” by the original acts, and those subsequent acts 
often grow more extreme in their wrongness. How this comes 
about is the next question to answer.  
A.  Imperceptible Differences  
If an action is committed, and is not criticized, 
punished, or otherwise labeled as wrong, it becomes “the 
standard.” It may not be criticized, even though many in the 
organization think that it is wrong, because their insecurity or 
their lower position in the organizational hierarchy makes 
them unwilling to say publicly what they really believe, which 
is that it is wrong. But when this happens, psychological 
research demonstrates an interesting process called “pluralistic 
ignorance.”14 Rather than realize that the other silent 
individuals are being silent for exactly the same reasons that 
he is, the individual tends to conclude that these others think 
that the act is an acceptably moral one and are keeping silent 
for that reason.15 The individual then, is the deviant, and under 
this pressure, comes to think that the act is more normal and 
more ethical than he previously thought. It is now the standard 
for what is allowable in this organizational context.  
But then, a slightly more unethical action becomes 
possible, and the then relevant question is the distance of this 
next possible act from the act that is now the standard. 
Tenbrunsel and Messick have a useful term for this, which is 
the “induction mechanism.”16 “This mechanism uses the past 
practices of an organization as a benchmark for evaluating new 
practices. If the past practices were ethical and acceptable, 
then practices that are similar and not too different are also 
acceptable.”17 In small steps, an organization moves from 
ethical actions, to ones that are ethically grey to ones that are 
simply immoral. 
It is possible that by progressing in these small steps, 
the organizational group never becomes aware of the moral 
  
 14 Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol 
Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm, 64 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 243, 243-56 (1993). 
 15 Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity 
is Interpreted as Dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 298, 298-305 
(1987). 
 16 Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 13, at 228. 
 17 Id. 
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wrongness of the procedures with which they end up. Recent 
business pages are full of reports of how insurance brokers got 
into the pattern of taking what were essentially kickbacks from 
insurance firms to whom they brought clients. The stories of 
the final stages of this process seems so prototypically corrupt 
that it is hard to believe that the perpetrators could code them 
as anything but unethical, but that they did so is not yet clear. 
However, it is difficult to think that at least some of those 
involved did not at some point see the wrongness of their 
actions. 
Here are some descriptions of the patterns of actions 
once the system was in full swing. Apparently charades were 
staged, in which some insurance providers were solicited to put 
in bids for insuring the broker’s clients, but the bids were 
organized so that they would be higher than the bid of the 
provider who was to be the eventual winner of the insurance 
contract. The purpose of this was to provide “proof” to the client 
that the broker had solicited bids and was giving the contract 
to the lowest bidder, as was proper.  
This is an interesting process, since it engages the high-
bidding insurance providers in the charade, with the incentive 
that they someday will allowed to be the “lowest bidder” and 
win a contract. One frequently sees mechanisms for recruiting 
other organizational units into a corrupt system, and here we 
have identified one 
These patterns, described as I have done, from the 
perspective of the final stages of the system, seem to so clearly 
be corrupt that it is hard to believe that they can be anything 
other than the consciously immoral acts of conspirators. 
However, if we think of a person being recruited into the 
system, it is possible that she would simply see it “as the way 
we do things around here.” We will return to this theme later. 
B. Loss Aversion 
Recent psychological research has conclusively 
demonstrated that people will go to great lengths to avoid 
losses.18 Several practices in corporate organizations have 
inadvertently guaranteed that that there will be “losses” to be 
averted. To illustrate this, we will return to our now familiar 
  
 18 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263-91 (1979).  
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example of quarterly profits. The stock prices of American 
companies are significantly dependent on the company slightly 
increasing its earnings on a quarter-by-quarter basis. This 
apparently is taken as the sure sign of a steadily more-
profitable company, one that one should invest in. However, on 
reflection, there are many reasons why good companies would 
not produce that patterning of profit: seasonal sales profiles for 
one, high expenditures in one quarter for research and 
development costs is another. Companies are led to accounting 
practices that allow for “earnings management” to enable them 
to produce the preferred steady rise in earnings even when 
more standard accounting practices would produce variable 
quarter by quarter gains.  
Suppose that you are in control of the accounting 
process in such a company and see that some perfectly 
justifiable expenses will bring you to earnings that fall just 
below those of the last quarter. And suppose that you correctly 
think that the “increased earnings every quarter” criterion is a 
stupid one. Yet you know that if you show reduced earnings in 
this quarter, the price of the company stock will drop, and 
research reports may comment about “disappointments at 
company X.” If you are one of the company’s executives that 
has a “pay for performance” plan, you realize that you may lose 
considerable sums of money, money that you had counted as 
already in your pockets. Would you stretch accounting rules to 
produce increased earnings? Perhaps not. But would you have 
been clever enough to “stash” some earnings from a previous 
highly profitable quarter that could now be pulled out of the 
“cookie jar”19 to produce those earnings in this quarter? They 
were, after all, perfectly legitimate. Would you be morally 
wrong to ensure that your company was buffered from the ups 
and downs in stock prices caused by the essentially stupid 
focus on increases in quarter-by-quarter earnings? 
Now recognize what is often the case, which is that the 
company CEO receives a good deal of added incentive pay if the 
corporation “makes its numbers” on a quarter-by-quarter basis. 
This means that there will be a good deal of pressure on the 
auditing group to make the audit output conform to the “steady 
growth in earnings” numbers. So the real question is not 
whether you yourself would independently produce numbers 
  
 19 Paul Munter, SEC Sharply Criticized “Earnings Management,” J. CORP. 
ACCT. & FIN. 31, 34 (1999). 
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that you think it might be morally justified to produce, but 
whether you would resist pressures from corporate superiors to 
do so. And thinking about this as the CFO would, you should 
realize that there are a number of cases in which CFO’s have 
been dead-ended or fired for refusing to go along with these 
directives from above.20 Loss aversion might be less of an 
abstract concept, and more a realistic fear of loss of job. 
V.  GROUP LOYALTY AND COMMITMENT  
We now see how an individual in an organization can 
impulsively take an action that is, from a perspective that was 
not apparent to the actor, wrong in the sense of being an action 
with morally flawed outcomes. Eventually, this action becomes 
known to other members of the organization. The question is 
how they react to it. We would hope that they would repudiate 
it, both because it is wrong and because it is likely to commit 
the organization to a bad course of action. However, there is 
one problem with people following this path. The action has 
already been taken. It is done. The pollutants have already 
been dumped into the river, or the quarter’s profits have been 
overstated, or the member of my in-group has been hired. Often 
the consequences of these actions are irreversible. And even in 
those few occasions when the action consequences can 
somehow be reversed, it is still the case that there are likely to 
be records around that they were the actions initially taken by 
the organization.  
Previously we considered the possibility that the 
performance of actions that from some outside perspective 
would be considered wrong might instead convince others 
within the organization that those actions were right in the 
context in which they were committed. They were, in other 
words, the way that my company does things. Now I want to 
consider another branch of the situation; the branch in which 
the other actors in the organization realize that the act is bad, 
either intrinsically bad or bad because of the consequences that 
will follow. Since the act has already been committed, the 
decision is not about making it disappear—that cannot be 
made to happen. The decision is between making others in the 
  
 20 For a discussion of this, see Stephen Barr, “You’re Fired,” CFO, Apr. 1, 
2000. 
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organization aware that bad actions have been taken and 
letting them continue, or abetting their continuation.  
It is likely, for reasons of loyalty to the group, loyalty to 
the person who made the bad decision, and a feeling that the 
commitment to the course of action is irrevocable, that others 
in the group will allow or abet the continuation of the actions. 
This is particularly true when the actors who have become 
aware take actions that seem to temporize, and keep open the 
possibilities of later actions that halt the bad practices. These 
actually often allow the bad course of action to continue to 
develop because if one does not intervene when one first 
becomes aware, it is very difficult to find an exact time when 
one should intervene later. 
A famous example of this comes from the first person 
account of the fraud that the Goodrich Company backed into 
committing when they were pursuing a design for aircraft 
brakes that could not possibly work.21 Briefly, an engineer had 
made calculational mistakes in designing a brake assembly for 
an airplane. The plans called for brake lining pads that were 
too small to provide the braking friction to stop the plane in the 
required distance. “The brake was too small. There simply was 
not enough surface area on the disk to stop the aircraft without 
generating the excessive heat that caused the linings to fail.”22  
From the point of view of our analysis, a critical incident 
then occurred. “New menaces appeared. An engineering team 
from LTV (the primary contractors) arrived at the plant to get 
a good look at the brake in action. Luckily, they stayed only a 
few days, and Goodrich engineers managed to cover the true 
situation without too much difficulty.”23 What I suggest is that 
the visit of outsiders caused the Goodrich personnel, although 
aware of the eventual guaranteed failure of the brake 
assembly, to rally to the support of their fellow engineers to 
conceal this critical fact. By doing so, many of them became 
complicit and caught up in perpetuating the fraud.  
A different case, with the same ultimate consequence, 
occurs when the individual who first committed the bad action 
shifts perspective, and sees the potential bad consequences of 
the bad action that he launched. Here he needs to make sense 
of his own past actions. The true reason that the person 
  
 21 Kermit Vandivier, Why Should My Conscience Bother Me?, in CORPORATE 
VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR PROFIT 145-72 (Stuart Hills ed. 1987).  
 22 Id. at 148. 
 23 Id. at 150. 
 4/19/2005 4:11:17 PM 
2005] PSYCHOLOGICAL PUZZLES IN CORRUPTION 1191 
committed the action is that he did not think at the time about 
the potential bad consequences of the action. From the intuitive 
perspective he adopted at the time of the decision, it was the 
right decision—or at least not the wrong one. This is the whole 
message of the previous excursion into the intuition-based 
decision system. However, one of psychology’s more interesting 
discoveries is that people do not grant themselves this sort of 
charity. Instead, hindsight causes them to think that it was a 
well-considered decision, made by the conscious, reasoning 
system. This retrospective perspective leads them to go into a 
sort of decision-hiding mode, in which they seek to deny their 
involvement in the decision, or to experience the dissonance 
they feel, and think of the reasons that the decision was the 
right one. To do the latter, they have to think about themselves 
in different ways. 
A.   Social Identity Considerations 
A theory developed in the last two decades24 has made 
and validated a very important point. When an individual is a 
member of a group, in the sense that she is committed to the 
purposes of the group and that a group has tasks to do, the 
task of the individual is to first become a prototypical member 
of that group, and then help the group as best she can in 
reaching its goals. Among other things, this may mean 
adopting the moral perspectives of the group.25 And recall what 
we said earlier. Because of pluralistic ignorance, she may not 
be aware that others in the group consider the initial act an 
unethical one. The signal that silence conveys to her is the 
incorrect but persuasive message that the group regards the 
initiating act as a morally appropriate one. The task of the 
individual group member is to accept that decision and move 
the group forward. This may mean taking actions that conceal 
the prior transgressions, but these may also be the actions that 
continue the bad course of action. In the example from Why 
Should My Conscience Bother Me?26 the loyalty-driven actions of 
the Goodrich workers in assuring the visiting team from the 
contractor that “everything is gong along ok,” contributed to 
  
 24 DOMINIC ABRAMS & MICHAEL HOGG, SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: 
CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES (1990).  
 25 Henri Tajfel, Cognitive aspects of prejudice, 1 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI., 173, 173-
91 (1969). 
 26 See Vandivier, supra note 21.  
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the continuation of the doomed fraud.27 The contractor then did 
not raise questions that could have headed off the final bad 
outcome.  
B. Alternate Identities Are On Offer 
The concept of identity can be made to do more work. 
There are identities in which it is part of the role enactment to 
adopt a different moral code from the one we usually espouse. 
The violence endemic in hockey and American football is an 
example. One inflicts violence on others in ways that would 
normally involve morally unacceptable acts. Of course, the 
allowable violence is constrained by rules, but there are two 
interesting things to note about that. Some acts of violence, like 
“late hits” in football and “slashing” in hockey are against the 
rules but a second set of rules is in existence to assign penalties 
for those rule infractions, which in some sense brings the rule 
violations “within” a broader domain of “rule acceptable” 
actions. Second, as has been commented on by those who follow 
sports, team members often collectively adopt a “persona” that 
makes the goal of inflicting harm on the other side acceptable 
and even desired. “Let’s get out there and knock them dead” is 
an injunction that brings violence within the somewhat 
ambiguous orbit of legitimacy in game settings. Other roles 
contain elements that legitimate morally dubious actions 
against others. 
And all of us can give a reasonable performance in at 
least many of the roles. Let me give you an example of a 
situation in which a person who had detected corruption and is 
set to denounce it, is sent away instead with an offer of a role. 
If he accepts the role, he will embrace the deception and play 
his part in continuing and expanding it. He has entered the 
situation as an upstanding person of high moral rectitude, 
which too is a role. But how will he continue on when that role 
is challenged? Notice in this specific situation, considerable 
pressure exists to accept the new, deception-embracing role.  
The dilemma arose for Michael Lewis, and is described 
in his book Liar’s Poker,28 in which he summarizes his 
experiences as a bond salesman in training with Salomon 
Brothers. An experienced trader had advised him that AT&T 
  
 27 See id.  
 28 MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989). 
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bonds would be good ones to sell to his customers and he sold 
about three million dollars worth to one of his clients. The 
bonds rapidly dropped in value, harming the customer and 
harming the relationship of trust that Lewis had built with the 
customer. A more experienced salesman clued Lewis that the 
reason that these bonds were “good ones to sell” was that they 
were in Salomon Brothers’ inventory, and the firm was quite 
sure that their value was going to decline. Thus they wanted to 
unload the bonds, and did so on unwary clients.  
Lewis protested to the trader, arguing that they had 
quite badly harmed the client and behaved in a way that 
contradicted their high-flown ethics codes about duties to 
customers. “Look,” he (the trader) said, losing his patience, who 
do you work for, this guy or Salomon Brothers?”29 At this point, 
Lewis realized that the real practice of Salomon Brothers was 
to mistreat clients for the good of the firm. If he were to stay at 
Salomon Brothers, he would need to adopt the identity of “the 
jammer,” a person who was willing to take these sorts of trust-
violating actions. But the only other identity available to him 
at the moment of decision was that of a naïve fool, who did not 
know the ways that the real world worked. And he was 
surrounded, in the close confines of the trading floor, by many 
others who would certainly have contempt for a naïve fool and 
publicly express that contempt. These are the circumstances in 
which people adopt identities that enable them to act 
unethically toward certain groups of others.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to solve two puzzles. First, why so 
many acts that generate bad moral consequences are begun by 
people we would think are proper moral actors. The answer is 
that they are what most of us are, which is intermittent moral 
actors. They take a moral perspective if the reasoning system is 
engaged, but otherwise can be driven by quite intuitive and 
automatic thinking to “solve the immediate problem” which 
will often be done quite pragmatically.  
The second problem might be called the “lemmings” 
problem. Why is it that other people in the organization so 
often seem to aid, abet, and advance the morally bad course of 
action? My answer here was more complicated, and involved a 
  
 29 See id. at 167. 
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set of independent but generally correlated processes. Some of 
the processes lead to the prior corrupt act being perceived as 
ethically appropriate “within the organizational context.” 
Others work by the engagement of a group loyalty or 
commitment, which causes people to work to conceal the prior 
corrupt actions from public view. This often entails further 
corrupt actions, either “covering up” the previous actions, or 
continuing them. It is sometimes the case that actors who 
previously were careful to act in moral ways, are now recruited 
into adopting a persona that goes along with, and even becomes 
an independent origin of corrupt practices.  
 
 
